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I. INTRODUCTION
An analysis of the history and development of Japanese divorce
law indicates a recent shift from the doctrine of matrimonial
offense to the doctrine of no-fault divorce. The doctrine of
matrimonial offense arises when one spouse commits an act, such
as adultry, which precipitates a divorce. The doctrine of no-fault
divorce has been used in circumstances when a marriage suffers an
irretrievable breakdown. After World War II, in 1947, the
Japanese Civil Code moved towards a more modern philosophy of
divorce law when it prescribed the following grounds for a judicial
divorce:
1. Husband or wife can bring an action for divorce only in the
following cases:
a. If the other spouse has committed an action of unchastity.
b. If he or she has been deserted maliciously by the other spouse.
c. If it is unknown for three years or more whether the other
spouse is alive or dead.
d. If the other party is attached [sic] with severe mental disease,
and recovery therefrom is hopeless.
e. If there exists any other grave reason for which it is difficult
for him or her to continue their marriage.
2. Even in cases where any or all of the grounds mentioned in items
1-4 inclusive of the preceding paragraph exist, the Court may dismiss
the action for divorce if it deems the continuance of the marriage
proper in view of all the circumstances.'
Before the recent decision of September 2, 1987,2 the Supreme
Court had rarely given a liberal interpretation of this provision of
the Civil Code as a means of granting a judicial divorce when the
petitioner for divorce is the spouse who has comitted a matrimonial
offense. Rather, the Court exercised its discretion to refuse a
1. Mwnpo (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898, Art. 770 at 11 1, 2 (2
EHS Law Bull. Series FAA 130) (translated into English by Fuklo Nakane).
Copies of all materials cited in this article are on file at the offices of The Transnational
Lawyer.
2. Judgment on the Admisibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground
For Divorce, 41 MiNsHu 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon
Questions of Constitutionality, 3-8 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan 1989). See 1243 HANSi 3 (Current Case Reports) (published by Hanrei Jihosha).
In Japan, cases are identified by date, as a means of protecting confidentiality.
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petition for divorce brought by the petitioner responsible for the
matrimonial offense.
A Supreme Court decision dated February 19, 1952' is an
example of the case law by the Supreme Court that prevailed until
the September 2, 1987 decision. This article focuses on the above-
mentioned cases, attempts to explain how their facts were
interpreted, and the rationale behind the Court's holdings.
II. A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE JAPANESE MATRIMONIAL
PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW UNDER THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM
Before looking at the Supreme Court's judicial interpretations
of Article 770 of the Civil Code, it is necessary to have a general
understanding of judicial divorce law propounded in the Civil Code
and case law under the Japanese legal system.
One type of divorce in Japan is a divorce without, or prior to,
obtaining a judicial divorce decree. The initial method of obtaining
a divorce is through a mutual agreement between both spouses. If
they agree to obtain a divorce (Article 763 in the Civil Code) and
notify the Family Registration Law (Koseki Ho) of their agreement,
then the divorce may be effectuated. Article 764 of the Civil
Code, quoting Article 739, states that "[a] marriage becomes
effective by notification thereof in accordance with the provisions
of the Family Registration Law."' Article 764 further states that
this notification also applies to divorce procedures.'
This procedure for obtaining a divorce was also availalbe under
the prior Japanece Civil Code. However, since the previous Civil
Code upheld the family system of male lineal descent and the
unequal matrimonial status of women, the husband was able to
coerce the wife into a legally fictitious, mutual divorce agreement.
3. 6 MiNsHu (No. 2) 110 (Civil Case Reports by the Supreme Court).
4. MINtpo (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898, Art. 739 (2 EHS Law
Bull. Series FAA 124) (translated into English by Fukio Nakane).
5. More detailed information in English can be obtained from, Guide to the Family Court
of Japan (published by the Supreme Court of Japan (1987)).
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As previously stated, there is no judicial participation in this type
of divorce.
If a husband and wife have failed to reach a mutual agreement
for divorce, a second method of obtaining a divorce is available
before resorting to a judicial divorce. Under this second
alternative, the married couple must apply to the Conciliation
Committee of the Family Court. Japan's present family court
system came into existence on January 1, 1947, shortly after World
War II. The Family Court's jurisdiction is restricted to the realm
of matrimonial domestic matters and juvenile cases according to
Article 31-3 of the Court Organization Law (Saibansho Ho) and
Article 9 of the Law for the Determination of Family Affairs
(Kajishinpan Ho). The Conciliation Committee of the Family
Court consists of one judge and two or more Conciliation
Commissioners. The Committee suggests certain arrangements
which may resolve the differences and conflicts that precipitate the
divorce.
If either party rejects these recommendations, the Family Court,
at its discretion, may refer the case to the residing judge of the
Family Court for his. determination. Following the judge's
determination, there is a two-week time period during which the
determination may be rendered null and void by an appeal from
either party. If this occurs, then one of the parties may take the
final step towards seeking a judicial divorce based on one of the
statutory grounds stated in Article 770 of the Civil Code. Under
the Law of Procedure in Action Relating to Personal Status (Jinji
Sosho Tetsuzuki Ho), either party may seek a judicial divorce by
petitioning the Civil District Court to try the case.
In general, the judicial interpretation and application of
holdings rendered by the Supreme Court form the legal authority
and provide the guidelines followed by the lower courts in future
trials of similar cases. Furthermore, case law can be changed by
a Supreme Court decision, provided all fifteen judges are present."
6. Japan has a system of written law as the source of law. Japan has no rules specifying the
binding force of precedent on case law. Japan only has rules such as Article 4 in Court Organization
Law (Saibansho Ho) that states, -[a] conclusion in a decision of a superior court binds courts below
in respect of the case concerned," and Article 10 in Court Organization Law that prescribes:
468
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These changes by the court may substitute different or opposite
views for the established ones. In this respect, Japanese practice
differs from that of England and the United States where a court
generally abides by its prior decisions as binding precedent.
Article 770, Paragraph 1, Parts 1 through 5, give two categories
of grounds for judicial divorce: those which can be concretely
defined and those which are more difficult to define. Parts 1
through 4 list the causes of divorce that may be concretely defined.
These causes may be further categorized into two subsets: "1. If
the other spouse has committed an act of unchastity," 7 and "2. If
he or she has been maliciously deserted by the other spouse.'"
Both of these causes of divorce relate to the doctrine of
matrimonial offense. The two remaining concretely defined causes
are: "3. If it is unknown for three years or more whether the other
spouse is dead or alive," 9 and "4. [If t]he other party is afflicted
with a severe mental disease and recovery therefrom is
hopeless."" The latter two cases are more closely related to the
concept of no-fault divorce.
Paragraph 2 of Article 770 gives the Court power to prevent
the divorce. This paragraph prescribes that the court may dismiss
Regulations of the Supreme Court will determine which cases are to be handled by the
Grand Bench and which by the Petty Bench; however, in the following instances, a Petty
Bench cannot render a decision:
(1) Cases in which a determination is made of the constitutionality of a law,
ordinance, regulation or disposition as a result of a contention of a litigant
(excluding cases where the opinion is the same as that of a decision previously
rendered through a Grand Bench in which the constitutionality of the law,
ordinance, regulation or disposition is recognized);
(2) Cases other than those mentioned in, the preceding item when the
unconstitutionality of a law, ordinance, regulation or disposition as recognized in
the Constitution or of any other laws or ordinances is contrary to that of a decision
previously rendered by the Supreme Court.
(3) Cases in which an opinion concerning the interpretation and application of the
Constitution or of any other laws or ordinances is contrary to that of a decision
previously rendered by the Supreme Court.
Quoted from the translation by the General Secretariat, Supreme Court, 3 (1981).
7. MINpo (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898, Art. 770 (2 EHS Law
Bull. Series FAA 130) (translated inot English by Fukio Nakane).
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id
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the divorce petition if, after observing all the circumstances, it
believes that there are adequate grounds to uphold the marriage
bond. Additionally, the Court may dismiss the case even if
grounds for divorce can be found in Parts 1-4 of Paragraph 1,
excluding Part 5.
Part 5 of Paragraph 1 uses less specific wording to describe
grounds for divorce which are more difficult to concretely define.
Part 5 lists as a cause for divorce "... . any other grave reason for
which it is difficult for him or her to continue the marriage."" In
some cases in which the Court fails to find grounds for divorce in
the categories covered by Parts 1-4, but where there has been
maltreatment such as cruelty, insult done by the other spouse, or a
mutual incompatibility of personality, the less specific wording of
Part 5 may provide the necessary grounds for divorce. However,
it remains uncertain precisely which circumstances "an
irretrievable breakdown of marriage" encompasses as legitimate
grounds for the termination of marriage. Also unresolved is the
controversial question of whether or not an action for divorce can
be instituted by a petitioner who is guilty of committing a
matrimonial offense which constitutes a legal wrong-doing. To
what degree is the petitioner responsible for the matrimonial
offenses he or she commits, and what conditions are then imposed
upon such a petition?
IT[. THE FACTS AND THE MAIN REASONS STATED IN THE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
There are two quite contrasting though typical cases that
exemplify the judicial interpretation and application of Article 770
Paragraph 1, Part 5 by the Supreme Court. In both the earlier case
(February 19, 1952) and the recent one (September 2, 1987),
divorce was sought by the husband who was the party responsible
for the matrimonial offense.
11. Id
470
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A. The February 19, 1952, Supreme Court Decision2
1. Background Information
In this case the parties were married in August, 1936 while the
husband was serving in the military. No children resulted from this
union, and the lack of a child caused a serious rift in the
relationship. The husband eventually formed a liaison with another
woman. His affair invoked numerous quarrels between he and his
wife, who demanded that he break off his relationship with his
mistress. The more serious quarrels were accompanied by violence
on the wife's part toward the husband. Eventually, the husband
left his wife, and began cohabitating with his lover who, on June
28, 1947, gave birth to a son. Finally, after more than ten years of
marriage, the husband filed a petition for divorce in June, 1948.
It was first dismissed by the District Court and later by an appeals
court.
In an appeal to the Supreme Court, the husband asserted that
the lower court had dismissed his petition for divorce on the
grounds of Article 770, Paragraph 1, Part 5 ("... any grave reason
for which it is difficult to continue the marriage) 3 for the reason
that it was the petitioner who had committed the matrimonial
offense, thereby violating the duty of "faith and trust on the
exercise of right and duty" established in the Civil Code.'
However, because there is no statutory authority for judging
whether a petitioner under Part 5 is blameworthy, the husband
argued that it was wrong for the Court to refuse his appeal. He
also argued that the Court did not consider his wife's violent
behavior toward him or the fact that the judgement had failed to
affect the continuance of the marriage bond. Furthermore,
petitioner complained that the judgement kept him in illegal
cohabitation with his mistress, left his only child without the
12. 6 MINSHu (No. 2) 110 (Civil Case Reports by the Supreme Court).
13. MRNO (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898, Art. 739, 11, Part 5
(2 EHS Law Bull. Series FAA 124) (translated into English by Fukio Nakane).
14. MInO (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898, Art. 1, 2 (2 EHS
Law Bull. Series FAA 130) (translated inot English by Fuldo Nakane).
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protection of the law, and burdened that child with the onus of
illegitimacy.
2. The Holding and Rationale
On February 19, 1952, the Supreme Court upheld the Appelate
Court's decision, saying there was no "grave reason" that the
marriage could not continue except the petitioner's misconduct in
leaving his wife and cohabitating with his lover. In other words,
the petitioner's own decision to discontinue the marital relationship
had brought about the present situation. Dependent upon the
petitioner to break off his illicit relationship and return to his wife,
the marital relationship must continue.
From the facts established in the lower court, the Supreme
Court found that the respondent's violent behavior towards her
husband was occasioned by her jealousy. The petitioner could
remove the causes of jealousy and his wife's resultant behavior by
returning to his wife and ending his relationship with his lover who
could not be exempted from blame since she fell in love with a
man knowing that he was already married
The Court held that the petitioner's statement that nothing
could be done to reestablish the marriage was self-serving and used
as an excuse for having left his wife and home, and for his
continuing to live with his mistress. The Supreme Court further
upheld the lower court's decision that approval of this petition
would cause further distress to the respondent, "adding insult to
injury, as the popular saying goes. '"' "Immoral and wilful
conduct like the petitioner's should not be permitted under our
system of justice."' 6 The judges observed that the law does not
require that a petition by a party guilty of a matrimonial offense be
dismissed; rather, a petition based on such an immoral and selfish
claim cannot be allowed. The judges then concluded "[t]he most
important purpose of the laws lies in upholding morality by
472
15. 6 MINsHu (No.2) 112 (Civil Case Reports by the Supreme Court).
16. ld.
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refusing to sanction immoral behavior. - The Court must interpret
all laws in accordance with this purpose.'
1 7
B. The September 2, 1987 Supreme Court Decision'8
1. Background Information
In this case, the couple was married on February 1, 1937. In
1948 they adopted two girls. The marital relationship was
compatible until 1948, when the* wife discovered that her husband
was having an affair. The husband subsequently separated from his
wife and began cohabitating with his lover. The husband continued
to live with his mistress up to the point when this case was heard,
more than thirty-six years later. During the intervening years, the
husband and his cohabitant had two offspring. The husband
recognized these children as his own in 1954."9
After their separation, the wife, who experienced monetary
difficulties, received the matrimonial house which she then sold.
She subsequently moved into her brother's home. At the time of
the trial the respondent was unemployed. The petitioner, on the
other hand, was the director of two successful companies. In 1951,
the husband filed a petition for divorce. This petition failed on the
ground that the petitioner was responsible for the matrimonial
offense. In 1983, petitioner was unsuccessful in his attempt to
obtain a divorce by mutual agreement through the Conciliation
Service of the Family Court. Under this unsuccessful agreement,
the husband was willing to pay one million yen (and give
respondent a painting) for the support of his wife. Finally, in 1984,
he petitioned a second time for a divorce. At the time of the 1987
17. Id
18. Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground
For Divorce, 41 MINsHu 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon
Questions of Constitutionality, 3-8 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan 1989). See 1243 HANi 3 (Current Case Reports) (published by Hanrei Jihosha).
19. Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground
For Divorce, 41 MiNsHu 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon
Questions of Constitutionality, 3-8 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan 1989). See 1243 HANn 3 (Current Case Reports) (published by Hanrei Jihosha).
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decision, the husband was seventy-five years old, and his wife was
seventy-one.
2. The Holding and Rationale
In its decision, the Court noted that historically divorce in the
Japanese legal system could be obtained either by mutual
agreement, or should there be an irretrievable breakdown of
marriage with an adversarial relationship existing between the two
parties, advise could be sought through the Conciliation Service, or
through a judgement by the Court. The Court ruled that an action
for divorce may be brought by either party since Article 770,
Paragraph 1, Part 5 does not restrain the petitioner-at-fault from
filing a petition for a judicial divorce. However, when the party
whose actions led to the breakdown of the marriage seeks the
approval of the Court to achieve his purposes, the result is to deny
the other party a freely determined part in the divorce procedures.
Such a one-sided petition for divorce should not be admitted
because such a judicial interpretation might weaken the institution
of judicial divorce. The aim of marriage is mutual cooperation for
life, with both husband and wife sincerely intending to remain
united physically and mentally. But when either or both of the
marriage partners refuse to cooperate to maintain the marriage
bond, and any sincere intention to continue the relationship has
been lost, then an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage has
occurred. Such a marriage contributes little or nothing to society.
To insist on the continuation of what is only the empty shell of a
dead marriage is unreasonable.
In the September 2, 1987 decision, the judges went on to point
out that divorce destroys the marriage bond which preserves the
social and legal order. As a matter of course, a petition for divorce
should not be against the principle of rightness and fairness, or
against the social ethic. Furthermore, the judges pointed out that
granting a divorce petition must be in line with the rule of "faith
and trust" that stands as the leading doctrine in all aspects of the
Civil Code, including family law. Judging whether or not the
petition by the party who is exclusively responsible for the
474
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matrimonial offense should be allowed, in light of the rule of
"faith and trust," a court should keep in mind the modes and
degrees of responsibility of the petitioner-at-fault, the party's
intention to continue the marriage, and the other party's sentiments
towards the petitioner. Additionally, in the event the court
approves the divorce petition, it must take into account information
concerning the mental, social and economic conditions of the other
party. The court must also consider the well-being of children
produced by the marriage, especially the education and welfare of
minor children who need the court's protection. Furthermore, the
court must consider the interests of other minor children born
through a de facto marriage formed by one or both of the parties
after the separation. A further factor to be considered is the length
of the separation period, since the passage of time may
significantly affect the circumstances, including shifts in social
norms and values.
After applying those factors, the Supreme Court held that it
was reasonable to conclude that the petition of the guilty party
could not be dismissed solely because it was brought by the
petitioner-at-fault. These factors included the fact that the husband
and wife had lived apart for most of their married life, there were
no minor children in their custody and no special circumstances
existed that would lead to such extreme social, mental and
economic distress towards the other party such that the approval of
the petition would be contrary to the intent of the social justice
system. In this case, little weight was given to arguments that
usually prevail against granting the petition on the grounds of
"other grave reasons" stated in Article 770, Paragraph 1, Part 5,
such as the respondent's grave mental or social status. The
financial disadvantages caused by this divorce could be settled by
a distribution of matrimonial property, and compensation for mental
suffering of the wife could be sought by an action brought at the
time of the divorce petition or after the decree was made. By the
end of the first oral hearing, the couple had been separated for
thirty-six years. Thus, in the Supreme Court's own explicit
conclusions concerning this petition for divorce, it is clear that
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grounds for divorce could be found in Paragraph 1, Part 5, even
though the petitioner, himself, was responsible for the cause."
C. Other Opinions
Although all fifteen judges of the Supreme Court agreed on the
conclusion reached in the September 2, 1987 decision, there was
one sub-opinion and one instructive opinion. The sub-opinion
addressed the matrimonial property settlement and the
compensation for mental suffering in order to ameliorate the other
spouse's financial hardship and mental instability. The sub-opinion
observed that, after the divorce decree is made, substantial security
is necessary for the other spouse to settle her financial
disadvantage. But, unless the other party makes a counterclaim or
a motion for the distribution of the matrimonial property in
accordance with Article 15, Paragraph 1, of the Law of Procedure
in Action Relating to Personal Status21 at the time that the petition
for divorce is brought, no settlement for the distribution of the
matrimonial property can be obtained after the divorce decree is
made. Article 768 of the Civil Code does not indicate which party
is permitted to petition for the distribution of the matrimonial
property, but it does state that if no agreement can be reached
20. Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground
For Divorce, 41 MINsHU 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon
Questions of Constitutionality, 3-8 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan 1989). See 1243 HArn 3 (Current Case Reports) (published by Hanrei Jihosha). In granting
the divorce decree, the Court declared:
the lower court erred in interpretation and application of paragraph 2, Article
1 and item 5, paragraph 1, Article 770 of the Civil Code, because it rejected
the claim without judging whether there exist such special factors and thus it
is evident that this error may affect the main text of the judgment. Therefore,
the Jokoku appeal has reason and the original judgment should be quashed.
And, since it is necessary for the court below to consider further whether or
not there exist any special factors, and it is proper to examine and resolve the
matter of economic payments accompanying a divorce if the Appellee applies
for it, the case should be remanded to the lower court.
21. The Law of Procedure in Action Relating to Personal Status, art. 15,1 1, prescribes that
at the annulment of marriage or the petition of divorce brought by the husband or wife, the court may
have the power to make the distribution of their matrimonial property for the other according to the
petition.
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through their private efforts, either party can seek the judgement.of
the Family Court to settle the unsuccessfully resolved conflict.'
In addition, according to Article 15, Paragraph 1 of the Law of
Procedure in Action Relating to Personal Status, a separate petition
for the distribution of the matrimonial property in addition to this
lawsuit is not required. The abstract form of motion without
specifying the amount and method of distribution of the
matrimonial property is sufficient to initiate Court proceedings.
Thus, a reasonable and fair interpretation of the law is that the
spouse who is obliged to supply the other's maintenance is
permitted to file such a petition in the same divorce lawsuit.
The instructive opinion takes a more severe view of the guilty
party's petition for divorce, stating that a petitioner who is mainly
or exclusively responsible for a matrimonial offense should not
have his petition approved, nor should a dismissal of his petition
be overruled except in special circumstances. This is not an
objection to the decision's conclusion, but instead, to the logical
procession which led to such a conclusion. The judge who wrote
this opinion stated that under an appropriate interpretation of the
law the Court may deny the petition for divorce brought by the
spouse responsible for the matrimonial offense. If the Court were
to allow a divorce based solely on the irretrievable breakdown of
marriage, or if the court were to freely admit a one-sided petition
for divorce, then its actions would conflict with the legal system
and the statutorily stipulated reasons for granting a divorce petition.
If the court were to act in this fashion, the respondent might easily
22. Article 768 in the Civil Code prescribes:
1. Husband and wife who has effected divorce by agreement 1979, may demand the
distribution of property from the other spouse.
2. If no agreement is reached or possible between the parties with respect to the
distribution of property in aqcordance with the provisions of the preceding
paragraph, any of the parties may apply to the Family Court for measure to take the
place of such an agreement, however, this shall ndt apply after the lapse of two
years from the time divorce.
3. In the case mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Family Court shall
determine whether any such is to be made or not, and if it is made, the sum of
property as is acquired by the cooperation of the and all other circumstances.
Mno (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898, Art. 768 (2 EHS Law Bull. Series
FAA 129) (translated into English by Fukio Nakane).
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lose the stability and benefits of marriage while the petitioner-at-
fault would be quite free from any restraint. It is natural, therefore,
that the Court should retain the power to decide whether or not a
divorce should be permitted, and to interpret the law pertaining to
judicial divorce in accordaice with fairness, equity, social ethics
and natural justice. This instructive opinion went on to hold that
.. . since marriage is the social and legal order based upon
morality, the divorce which dissolves this relationship should also
be justifiable in light of the morality and social norm, and should
not damage human dignity and not contradict the equity of both
sexes. And as the marriage is based only on the mutual consent of
both sexes, we may basically require that the divorce which
terminates marriage should be based on the consent of both
spouses."
A petition for divorce which is not in compliance with this rule
of good faith should be forbidden by the Court. The legal system
should make divorce difficult, and should secure the matrimonial
well-being of the respondent. If the legal system were to make
divorce easy, the social and economic security of the respondent
would be left to chance. If the accessibility towards obtaining a
divorce were to be widened by the Court, the petitioner-at-fault
would be free, not only of moral responsibility, but also of
economic and social obligations to the other party. "To begin
with, in interpretation and enforcement of divorce law, we cannot
disregard the social system of the country, especially the institution
of family, economic regime, legal system, religion, climate and the
national character, whereas I have doubt on whether our morality
or sense of justice is generous for a responsible spouse who has
created the cause for divorce.""' Therefore, the Court should
23. Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground
For'Divorce, 41 MINSHU 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon
Questions of Constitutionality, 3-8 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan 1989). See 1243 HANn 3 (Current Case Reports) (published by Hanrei Jihosha).
24. Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground
For Divorce, 41 MrNsHu 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon
Questions of Constitutionality, 3-8 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan 1989). See 1243 HANJn 3 (Current Case Reports) (published by Hanrei Jihosha).
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exercise discretion in determining whether or not a divorce is to be
permitted.
It would, however, be excessive to deny all petitions from
parties guilty of marital offense. Such a denial would also be an
unethical distortion of Japanese law. Petitions brought by those
who have committed matrimonial offenses may be allowed through
an interpretation of the law that takes into account special
circumstances which establish that the offense occurred after the
breakdown of the marriage, or that it was induced by the other
party's behavior. Other special circumstances to be considered
include cases where the other spouse is willing to accept a divorce,
or when objection to the divorce petition is based upon the
respondent's desire for revenge on account of the petitioner's past
misconduct for which he or she has already provided satisfactory
compensation with regard to the respondent's and children's
mental, social and economic hardship. Thus, the precedental case
law that restricts the petitioner-at-fault from bringing an action for
divorce should not be changed. However, when such extenuating
circumstances exist, the legal system may exonerate the petitioner
from his past culpable conduct, and grant the petitioner a divorce
decree.
IV. COMMENTS AND COr CLUSION
In considering how the historical, cultural, and social
environment in Japan influenced the legal decision-making process,
it is significant that the former decision (February 19, 1952) was
made by the Supreme Court shortly after the end of World War II.
The latter decision (September 2, 1987) was made some thirty-five
years later. During the twentieth century, Japan has undergone
many political, economic and social changes, including changes in
the way the legal system has been implemented. In order to
understand these changes, one must consider their historical
context. In contrast to the United States where the cultural and
social climate has consistently reflected the democratic ideals
established by the Declaration of Independence, the social and
cultural climate in Japan has been marked by the blending of both
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traditional values and those of the current democratic state. For
many centuries, the Imperial Dynasty reigned supreme in Japan.
A period of feudalism followed, lasting approximately three
hundred years. That era was followed by the re-establishment of
imperial power during the Meiji period in which imperial
absolutism was consolidated through the Old Constitution.' But
by the end of World War II in i945, this system of government
had been destroyed and replaced by the New Constitution which
placed sovereign power in the hands of the Japanese people, and
established the current democratic state.2
The period following World War II has also been a period of
remarkable social and economic transformation. During this era,
the traditional values, deeply embedded in the social and cultural
fabric of Japan, have been overlaid by the new democratic values
imposed on Japan as a result of her military defeat. Consequently,
in the current social, moral, legal, and political environment of
Japan, old hierarchical and modem democratic values co-exist.
This makes the Japanese experience uniquely different from its
American counterpart. Unlike the United States which has an
ethnically heterogeneous population and a long history of
democracy, Japan has an ethnically homogeneous population and
a long history of cultural uniformity, strongly influenced by her
heritage of an emperor system and Confucianism. The sudden
imposition of democracy on top of the old traditional values has
created, especially in the period immediately following the War, a
sense of confusion and uncertainty in the minds of the Japanese
people. Feeling free from the old values, some individuals acted
unrestrained in an attempt to enjoy life, even if this involved
immoral sexual behavior.' During this period, there was a
25. For example, Article 1 in the old Constitution prescribed, "[t]he Empire of Japan shall
be reigned over and governed by the Emperors unbroken for ages eternal." and Article 3 in the old
Constitution decreed, "'[t]he Emperor is sacred and inviolable.'" I Japanese Government Documents
136 (W. Maclaren ed.).
26. For example, Article I of the Constitution of Japan states, "[t]he Emperor shall be the
symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people
with whom resides sovereign power."
27. The judges of the Supreme Court in the former decision (Feb. 19, 1952) considered such
immoral sexual behavior. See 6 MiNsHU (No. 2) 112.
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significant shift in the attitude towards family life, marriage,
divorce, and other family matters. This shift was reflected in
national policies concerning divorce.'
For example, the ratio between arranged marriages and non-
arranged marriages has changed markedly. In 1947, the percentage
of arranged marriages was about seventy percent, while on the
other hand, only thirty percent of all marriages were non-arranged
marriages. According to statistics produced by a government
survey, these figures had been reversed by 1984Y Recently,
statistics also indicate that a husband and wife who are middle-
aged are increasingly inclined to get divorced when their marriage
life and obligations are close to a turning point, after their children
have grown and become independent."
A useful comparison is between the number of divorces in
1952, at the time of the February 19, 1952 decision, and the
number of divorces in 1987, at the time when the latter case was
decided. The statistics in Japan for, 1952 showed 79,021 divorces.
This is equivalent to a ratio of 0.92 per 1,000 persons. In 1987
there were 158,227 divorces, a ratio of 1.30 per 1,000 persons.
These statistics indicate that the number of divorces has been
increasing at a significant rate. However, more recently the
28. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing the widely divergent legal values
in Japanese society). Nowadays, Article 13 in the Constitution of Japan prescribes, "[aIll of the
people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness shall
... be the supreme consideration .... "" and Article 24 prescribes '[m]arriage shall be based only
on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with equal
rights of husband and wife as a basis. With regard to ... divorce .... law shall be enacted from
the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the both sexes." Thus, these legal
values have precedence in modem Japanese society.
29. See Summary of the 8th Fertility Survey in 1982 29 (Inst. of Population Problems,
Ministry of Health and Welfare (The Marriage and Fertility of Japanese Research Series) (Mar. 25,
1983)).
30. According to a 1982 government survey, the number of divorces among women in their
30's and 40's dramatically increased. Ministry of Healtli & Welfare, Statistics & Information
Department, Minister's Secretariat, Divorce Statistics, SPECiAL REPORTS op VrrAL STATISTICS 19
(1984) [hereinafter VrrAL STATISTICS]. In 1986, the total number of women who became divorced
was 109,759. The number of women over 40 years of age who had been married for over twenty
years was 13,744. Table 6, Divorce by Age of Husband and Wife and Duration of Marriage [for
divorces performed in 1986] 492 (cited in 2 VrrAL STATISTICS (1986)). Also, the percentage of
divorces where the wife was over 40 years of age was 12.4% in 1965; by 1985 it had increased to
27.4%. 1 VrrAL STATISTICS 377 (1985).
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number of divorces has slightly decreased from a total of 178,746
in 1984 to 166,640 in 1985, in contrast with. a total of 179,150 in
1983."
Approximately ninety percent of all divorces are made privately
through the mutual consent of both parties, and about nine percent
result from the mediation of the Conciliation Service in Family
Court. Only about one percent of all divorces are made by the
courts. The above-mentioned rates produced by the three kinds of
divorce procedures have remained at about the same percentage
levels for seventeen years.'2 Although there has not been a
significant change in the percentage breakdown of procedures, the
31. 1 VITAL STATIsTICS 322-327 (1984); 1 VITAL STATISTICs 369, 371 (1985); 2 VrrAL
STATISTICS 490 (1986). According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, there were 153.600
divorces in 1988. See I VITAL STATISTICS 373 (1988); Divorce Statistics in VrrAL STATISTICS 38
& 42 (1984). Compared with a U.S. divorce rate per 1,000 population of 4.96 in 1985, and 4.80 in
1986, the rate in Japan was 1.39 in 1985 and 1.37 in 1986. See Statistics Bureau, General Affairs
Board, (Japan), Kokasai Tokei Yoran, (Survey for International Statistical) 25 (1988) & 25 1988. See
also U.S. DEPART. COMM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNrrED STATES 88 (109 ed. 1989) (the
U.S. divorce rate per 1,000 population of 4.8%).
However, Americans may have a happier married life than do the Japanese. This is evidenced
by a comparative analysis of the statistics on planned and attempted suicides in the two countries.
In 1985, the ratio of planned and attempted suicides among Japanese wives was 17% and 5%
respectively, whereas, it was only 2% and 3% respectively, among American wives. Furthermore,
Japanese couples are more likely than their American counterparts to believe that their married
acquaintances are happier than themselves. In 1985, 19% of all Japanese couples, as compared to
9% of American couples, believed that other married couples were more content than they were. On
the other hand, 17% of American couples, as compared to 6% of all Japanese couples, believed that
their married acquaintances were less happy than themselves. Hamura, Cargan & Sakai, A Cross-
Cultural Comparison on the Marriage-Life ofJapanese and ofAmericans, 24B BULL. OF OKAYAMA
U. SC. 166 (1989). These statistics corroborate the findings of a 1983 Japanese Government Survey
which indicated that only 25% of Japanese wives were very satisfied with their married life, as
compared to 66% of all American wives. See Secretariat Office of Prime Minister, Fujinmodal
nikanthuru Kokusaihikaku Chosaketsuka no Gaiyo [The Outline for the Result of the International
Comparison Survey on Women's Problems] 62 (1983). The results of these surveys seem to indicate
that, compared with American wives, Japanese wives tend to remain in unsatisfactory marriages
rather than take step toward divorce.
32. For example, in 1955 the percentage of divorce by mutual agreement was 92.8%, the
percentage of divorce by the Conciliation Service was 6.4% and the percentage by judicial divorce
was 0.8%. In 1984, these three kinds of divorce procedures produced divorce percentages of 91.3%,
7.6%, and 1.0% respectively. See 1 VITAL STATISTICS 327 (1984). According to the Ministry of
Health & Welfare, from 1965 to 1982 the divorce rate by mutual agreement ranged from 89.4% -
90.4%, the rate by Conciliation Service ranged from 8.5%-9.6% and the rate by judicial divorce
ranged from 1.0% - 1.2%. Divorce Statistics in VITAL STATISnCS 17 (1984). However, in 1952,
when the former decision was made, the divorce rate by mutual agreement was 93.8%, by
Conciliation service, 5.4% and by judicial divorce, 0.8%. Id.
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increase in the shear number of persons obtaining divorces
indicates definite tendency towards an acceptance of divorce as a
viable solution to irresolvable marital difficulties.
The general inclination of divorce law in modern times is to
prescribe by relatively abstract grounds in order to relax the
restrictions against divorce and consequently to grant divorce more
freely. If, in general theory, the doctrine of the irretrievable
breakdown of marriage is interpreted to mean that the petitioner-at-
fault may bring a divorce action over the objection, and to the
detriment of the innocent party, then there is no express restriction
to bar such a petition by the petitioner-at-fault in our legal system.
Because our legal justice should not allow such a petition in so far
as it subverts the petitioner's matrimonial obligation (for example,
the legal obligations of chastity, of mutual cooperation and support,
and of matrimonial cohabitation) 3 we must resort to the general
rule of "faith and trust," the "prohibition of an abuse of right" in
the Civil Code,' an interpretation such as the rule of "equity," or
to a realization that the approval of a petition by a petitioner
responsible for his matrimonial offense is against the accepted
social ethic.
The Supreme Court's decision of February 19, 1952, and
decisions which followed that decision will now be examined.
Needless to say, all the Supreme Court judges were born in the
Meiji Age, representative of a sense of the old morals, values, and
customs of the traditional Japanese society. In spite of their mixed
feelings, stemming from their allegiance to the old way of life,
these judges rejected all the legal values and laws which conflicted
with the new legal system based on the new democratic
Constitution of Japan, adopted in 1947. Yet, one could not expect
a positive attitude towards an interpretation of the law that
recognized the breakdown of marriage as grounds for judicial
divorce under Article 770, Part 1, Paragraph S. As a result, the
483
33. Article 752 in the Civil Code prescribes the, -[h]usband and wife shall cohabit and shall
cooperate and aid each other." MlNpo (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898,
Art. 752 (2 EHS Law Bull. Series FAA 127) (translated into English by Fukio Nakane).
34. Id. at art. 1, " 2, 3.
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thrust of the Supreme Court's decision strongly stressed
matrimonial morals, ethics and order, stating, "[p]etitions based
upon such immoral and selfish claims cannot be allowed. The
most important purpose of our laws lies in upholding morality by
refusing to sanction immoral behavior."" Furthermore, the
Supreme Court criticized social behavior, noting "[riecently we
worry about the sexual ill-behavior between both sexes being too
excessive after the war."'
By the time of this decision, the Court had already realized that
Article 770, Paragraph 1, Part 5 in the Civil Code was essentially
grounded in the new doctrine of "breakdown of marriage." The
court admitted that there is no explicit provision to bar the bringing
of an action by a petitioner-at-fault, but the Supreme Court was
afraid to recognize a divorce petition which would permit the
husband to remove his wife from their home without accusing him
of matrimonial offense, as was the custom under the old divorce
law.
The February 19, 1952 decision was the main method of
supporting matrimonial morals and order. Here, the Court applied
the doctrine of "faith and trust" in denying divorce petitions from
petitioners who were mainly responsible for the matrimonial
offense.'
After the February 19, 1952 decision, the Supreme Court made
a more exact interpretation of the petitioner-at-fault who was
exclusively or primarily held responsible for the matrimonial
offense. However, the breakdown of marriage is often caused by
the destructive influence or negligence of both parties.
Furthermore, in many instances, it is difficult to determine who the
party at fault is.' In these latter cases, the divorce decree is
obtainable by both parties. However, the petitioner who is mainly
or exclusively responsible for the matrimonial offense is not
omitted from this category of petitioner-at-fault, even though the
35. 6 MINsnu (No. 2) 112 (Civil Case Reports by the Supreme Court).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 121.
38. 10 MINSHU (No. 12) 1537. The Supreme Court's decision on December 11, 1956, was
approved for the petitioner because both parties were found to be at fault.
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other party may have partly contributed to the breakdown of the
marriage."'
In a later decision on May 21, 1971, the Supreme Court
allowed an application by a petitioner-at-fault in a case where the
matrimonial offense occurred after the breakdown of marriage.
The court reasoned that there was no cause-and-effect relationship
between the matrimonial offense and the marriage breakdown.'
Until this decision, similar cases in the lower courts and in the
Supreme Court had followed the former precedent -- although there
were some cases where which the courts distinguished the facts
from the 1952 decision.
I have already introduced the facts and main reasons set forth
in the decision of September 2, 1987. This next segment examines
the decision itself. The Supreme Court approved the petition
brought by a petitioner-at-fault which the lower court had rejected.
Without denying the effectiveness of the three kinds of divorce
procedures (mutual agreement, arrangements made by the Family
Court's Conciliation Committee and judicial divorce), the approach
taken by the Supreme Court, from one point of view, depends on
whether or not the judicial divorce is against the. other partner's
free will. Thus, the Supreme Court applied the general rule of
"faith and trust" to this case, stating that, as a matter of course, a
petitioner for divorce should not be against the ideas of rightness
and fairness or against the social ethic. The Supreme Court's
ruling was in alignment with the rule of "faith and trust" which
stands as the leading doctrine in all spheres of the Civil Code,
including family law. Consideration of whether or not the
petitioner is the party exclusively responsible for the matrimonial
offense is permitted in light of the rule of "faith and trust." Thus,
39. 15 KASAI GEPPo (No. 8) 56 (Monthly Bulletin on the Family Court) (1963). (The decision
came on June 7, 1963).
40. 25 MINSHU (No. 3) 408 (The Supreme Court decision of May 21, 1971, was approved
for the petitioner).
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one should keep in mind the modes and degrees of responsibility
of the petitioner-at-fault. 1
The Supreme Court's application of this consideration indicates
three concrete requirements for its utilization. The first factor to
be considered is the length of the period of separation of the
parties. In this case, both parties had been separated for a
considerable length of time -- about thirty-six years. This period
of time was compared with the period of time of their marital
cohabitation (about twelve years) and with their ages at the time of
the divorce suit. I do not believe that a separation of thirty-six
years is necessary for the petitioner-at-fault to obtain a divorce
decree, however, it remains uncertain what the minimum length of
the separation period should be. Some decisions in the lower
courts have approved divorce petitions by petitioners-at-fault whose
circumstances were similar to those of the petitioner-at-fault in the
September 2, 1987 case. These cases all have involved very
substantial periods of separation (more than twenty years'
separation in the judgement by the Tokyo High Court on May 29,
1980;2 thirty-six. years' of separation in the judgement by the
Sendai High Court on December 14, 1984;' twenty-three years'
of separation in the judgement by the Tokyo District Court on
December 24, 1986;" and more than twenty-seven years' of
separation in the judgement by the Okayama District Court on June
30, 1987).45
Besides these cases, there are other cases which have involved
relatively short periods of separation. An eight-year period of
separation, after five years of marriage, was sufficient for the
parties involved to obtain a divorce in the decision of December
27, 1960, by the Nagano District Court" and about a five-year
41. Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground
For Divorce, 41 MINsHu 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon
Questions of Constitutionality, 3-8 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan 1989). See 1243 HANnI 3 (Current Case Reports) (published by Hanrei Jihosha).
42. 968 HANJI 62.
43. 1147 HANni 107.
44. 1223 HANni 81.
45. 640 HANJI 237.
46. 115 HAN1 98.
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period of separation sufficed in the decision of August 30, 1977 by
the Tokyo District Court. '7 If a considerable period of separation
is required, both parties will be very old by the time they obtain
their divorce decree. In the September 2, 1987 case, the petitioner
was seventy-five years old and the respondent was seventy-one.
Needless to say, if a petitioner is young, the sooner the divorce is
granted, the better, in order to enable "... . the empty legal shell to
be destroyed with maximum fairness and minimum bitterness,
distress and humiliation.""
The other two considerations indicated by the Supreme Court
were whether or not the parties have any minor children in their
custody and whether or not the non-petitioning partner will
experience a great deal of mental, social or economic hardship after
the divorce. In the September 2, 1987 decision the two adopted
daughters were adults at the time of the decision. The Supreme
Court was satisfied from the record that the wife would not
experience grave mental, social or economical hardship after the
divorce.
It is worthy to note how these matters" have been treated in
recent decisions by the lower courts. In the decision on May 29,
1980 by the Tokyo High Court the marriage had produced five
children who had all become adults during a period of separation
between the spouses which had lasted over twenty years. The
Court noted that the wife would not incur any financial difficulties
as a result of the divorce. The Court further mentioned that the
parties had sincerely tried to reconcile their differences, and that
the petitioner was not solely responsible for the matrimonial
breakdown (although some suspicion about his sexual relationship
with another woman was seen in the judgement).
The decision of December 14, 1984 by the Sendai High Court
stated that there were five children. Two children had died and
three were no longer minors. The Court noted that the parties'
47. 872 HANJn 85.
48. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, The Field Choice: Reform of the Grounds of Divorce,
Cornnd. 3123, 15 (1966).
49. 968 HANJI 62.
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relatives gave sufficient support to the wife to ensure a comfortable
life-style even though she had no property or earnings.-
The decision of December 24, 1986 by the Tokyo District
Court indicated that there were no problems concerning the welfare
of the children. At the time of the decision, the children were
financially independent and the husband had already distributed the
proper amount of his property to his estranged wife. 1
Finally, in the June 30, 1987 decision by the Okayama District
Court, the plaintiff (the husband) and the defendant (the wife) had
no children in their marriage. However, the petitioner did have
two daughters from his illegal union with a woman whom he had
been cohabiting with for more than twenty years. The husband had
previously resided with his wife for only seven months. Both
daughters were no longer minors. The petioner was fifty-nine
years old and the respondent was fifty-five years old at the time of
the court's decision. The defendant was expected to receive
twenty-five million yen for her financial support as a result of the
distribution of property after the divorce. The respondent's refusal
of the divorce seemed to the Court to result from excessive feelings
of reprisal or revenge. To approve this divorce was not against the
rule of "faith and trust in the performance and exercise of the
rights and duties" of marriage even though the plaintiff was solely
responsible for the original matrimonial offense. 2
In their interpretation and application of Article 770, Paragraph
1, Part 5 in the latter decision of September'2, 1987, it appears that
the Supreme Court moved towards the decisions of the lower
courts which granted divorce in cases brought by the petitioner-at-
fault.
Additionally, in a similar case on November 24, 1987,"3 the
Supreme Court dismissed an appeal brought by the wife
(respondent) against the appellate court's decision on December 15,
1986 approving the divorce petition by the husband (petitioner),
50. 1147 HANJI 107.
51. 1223 HANJI 81.
52. 640 HANn 237.
53. SAEBANsHu (No. 152) 233 (1987) [Civil Case, Reported by the Supreme Court] No. 152,
233 (1987). See 654 HANJI 137.
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thereby following the precedent established in the decision of
September 2, 1987. In the November 24, 1987 case, the period of
cohabitation was short (six years), but the period of separation was
long (thirty years) so that, at the time of the divorce hearing, the
parties were already of an advanced age. There were no minor
children. Moreover, since there were no special circumstances,
such as extreme bitterness or distress caused by mental, social or
economic factors, the approval of this petition was not remarkable
as being contrary to social justice. Thus, the Court concluded that
the petition was properly approved. The Court based its conclusion
on the rationale that the lower court should not dismiss a divorce
petition for the sole and exclusive reason that the plaintiff is a
petitioner-at-fault.'
Likewise, in two later decisions, February 12, 1988"' and pril
7, 1988, the Supreme Court again followed the precedent
established in the decision of September 2, 1987. In the February
12, 1988 case, by the end of the oral hearing in the High Court, the
period of separation had been about twenty-two years. In the April
7, 1988 case, the period of separation had been about sixteen years.
In both cases, the Court was satisfied with the conditions which the
Supreme Court had required in the decision of September 2, 1987.
In each case, the High Court ruled that the petitioner-at-fault could
not obtain a divorce, resulting in an appeal by the petitioner-at-
fault. The Supreme Court stated that, in addition to the divorce
case itself, another trial was necessary to reconsider whether or not
there were special circumstances, and to determine the financial
needs of the defendant. The Supreme Court overruled both
decisions and remanded the cases to the High Court for
reconsideration.
There are other theories by which a petition by a petitioner-at-
fault can be approved. For example, the decision of December 14,
1984 by the Sendai High Court was based on the theory of
54. SAiBANsHu (No. 152) 233 (1987) [Civil Case Reports by the Supreme Court]. See 654
HANJI 137.
55. SAIBANsHu (No. 153) 335 (1988) [Civil Case, Reports by the Supreme Court].
56. SAiBANsHu (No. 154) 1 (1988) [Civil Case, Reports by the Supreme Court].
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exemption from matrimonial offense in view of the parties' long
period of separation." On the other hand, from an academic point
of view, the plea of "clausula rebus sic stantibus," normally
applicable to claims in property contracts, might be applied to
divorce cases. Furthermore, there is an interpretation for making
a more lenient judgement in the case of a prolonged cohabitation
by a petitioner-at-fault and his lover. In addition, a "no fault"
interpretation was made in the Diet Discussion which preceded the
creation of Article 770, Paragraph 1, Part 5 in 1946. This
interpretations was not derived purely from the doctrine of
marriage breakdown. However, the interpretation does seem to be
against those opposing those who do not approve of petitions by
the petitioner-at-fault.
In conclusion, a primary difference between divorce by the
mutual agreement of both parties and divorce by the judicial
divorce process is that the former is available for obtaining a
divorce regardless of the reason or cause for divorce. The validity
of this type of divorce is based on the parties' voluntary agreement
and showing that there is absolutely no conflict. It might be said
that this, divorce by mutual agreement means not only "marriage
breakdown" but also a "free divorce," or "dissolution of
marriage.'8
On the other hand, a divorce by the judicial divorce process
requires, as the minimum standard, a state-imposed divorce of an
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage in question. Thus, at the
judges discretion, it is enough to establish that there exists an
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. It should be noted that
Article 770, Paragraph 2 provides that "in cases where any or all
of the grounds mentioned in items (1) to (4), inclusive of the
preceding paragraph exist, the Court may dismiss the action for
divorce if it deems the continuance of the marriage proper in view
of all circumstances." It should also be noted that this article
57. 1147 HAJn 107.
58. I prefer the more neutral terms "free divorce" or -marriage dissolution" to the term
*marriage breakdown," which has a strong and definite negative connotation.
59. MIupo (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898, Art. 770 (2 EHS Law
Bull. Series FAA 130) (translated into English by Fukio Nakane).
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does not apply to divorce under Article 770, Paragraph 1, Part 5:
"... if there exists any other grave reason for which it is difficult
for him or her to continue the marriage."'  Thus, divorce
petitions based upon these causes (Article 770, Paragraph 1, Parts
1-4) are practically limited to being brought to court by the
innocent party. That is, they can only be brought to court if the
other party has committed an act of unchastity (Part 1), or because
of the other party's malicious desertion (Part 2), or on account of
the other party's disappearance for more than three years (Part 3),
or because of the other party's acquisition of a severe mental
disease from which there is no hope of recovery ((Part 4) - which
might be termed a dual no-fault divorce). These innocent party (or
dual no-fault) petitions may be dismissed by the Court's utilization
of the provision provided in Article 770, Paragraph 2. If an
interpretation based on Article 770, Paragraph 1, Part 5 is opened
in the widest scope (an irretrievable breakdown of marriage being
the only basis to obtain a divorce decree with no conditions) it is
easier for the petitioner, regardless of whether or not he is
responsible for the matrimonial offense, to obtain a divorce decree
under Part 5 than on any of the other grounds.
If the court were to apply Paragraph 2 to Part 5 in the same
manner as applied to the grounds specified in Parts 1 through 4,
then the Court might deny a petition under Part 5 from the
petitioner-at-fault. The Court must make a more strict and careful
interpretation when permitting divorce decrees on the provisions of
Part 5. This view is nearly identical to the one expressed by one
of the Supreme Court judges in his instructive opinion which
supplemented the conclusion of the Court's decision in the case of
September 2, 1987." A more proper and reasonable interpretation
for Part 5 is that unless there are special circumstances which are
opposed to social order, ethics, justice and equity, judging from all
60. Id.
61. Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground
For Divorce, 41 MINSHU 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon
Questions of Constitutionality, 13 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of
Japan 1989). See Section 111, 2C.
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circumstances, the Court is allowed to grant a divorce decree in the
following cases:
1. In cases where there is a counter-petition or a preliminary petition
brought by the innocent party who has no objection towards getting a
divorce decree.
2. In cases where the other spouse's refusal is due to a revengeful or
malicious attitude towards the petitioner solely because of the
petitioner's past misconduct for which he has already provided
satisfactory compensation to the other party and their children, whose
mental, economic and social well-being is not in jeopardy.
3. In cases where the matrimonial offense was induced by the other
party.
4. In cases where the matrimonial offense has occurred after the
breakdown of the marriage
5. In cases where the petitioner-at-fault has frequently and sincerely
tried for reconciliation.
Of course, in addition to the foregoing, the ability to maintain
the financial support payments to the other party and to the
children in that party's custody who need such support must not
pose a problem. However, we should keep in mind that all these
cases were brought to court by the husband (a petitioner-at-fault),
and not by the wife. The innocent partner's (wife's) intention to
continue her marriage bond as a result of her responsibilities as a
parent (if there are children) stems from a desire to maintain a
stable economic condition.
Cases brought by the petitioner-at-fault that have been
discussed here have involved petitioners who were elderly or near
to being elderly.' The long periods of separation appear to be
excessive for such a petitioner who may be too old to enjoy his
62. In the approved cases mentioned in Section IVA, the Notification of Marriage Records
give the following registration dates:
Marriage
Registration
Judgement Date
Sendai High Court decision, December 14, 1984: 1926
Tokyo High Court decision, May 29, 1980: 1937
Tokyo District Court decision: December 24, 1986: 1943
Supreme Court decision, February 12, 1988: 1948
Supreme Court decision, April 7, 1988: 1949
Okayama District Court decision, June 30, 1987: 1959
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remaining years by the time he obtains his divorce decree. If the.
other conditions are satisfied, a shorter period of separation, may
suffice for a petitioner-at-fault to obtain a divorce decree.'
Currently, there are no provisions concerning the minimum
duration of the period of separation needed to obtain a judicial
divorce. Steps should be taken to create a more certain and shorter
period of separation. This move would help to clarify the
requirements in obtaining a judicial divorce under Article 770,
Paragraph 1, Part 5.
63. In several different countries, the legislative organ that is reasonable for divorce policy
has shown much interest in defining the length of the separation period, one year or two years or so,
required for the granting of divorde. For example, in England, with relation to a "one year time-bar
for divorce from the date of marriage (The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act, Part 1 (1984))
it was discussed in the legislative process as a different yet relative reason (Parliamentary Debate
[H.C.] Special Standing Committees 203-04, col. 83 (Mar. 22 & 27, 1984).
64. Note: There is further information for those interested in seeing the entire contents of the
September 2, 1987, Decision. This has been translated into English by the Ofice of Supreme Court.
See Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for the Ground For
Divorce, 41 MINsHU 1423; 23 Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon Questions
of Constitutionality, 13 (translated into English by General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan
1989).
For additional information on divorce law in Japan, see the following materials: 1218 HANst
193; Izumi, Chushoteki Rikon Genin toshiteno Hatangenin in 2 KONINHO NO KENKYU 266 Yuhikaku,
(1976); Kaji, Sekyokuteki Hatanshugi to Shokyokuteki Hatanshugi in 2 KONINHO NO KENKYU 272,
Yuhikaku (1976); Kuld, Yusekihaigusha no Rikonseikyu in 897 JURIST 56, Yuhikaku; Nakagawa,
Rikon Seikyuken Ranyo in 2 KENRI NO RANYO 50, Yulikaku (1962); Oota, Fufu no Horitsu,
Yuhikaku, (1980); Oota, Hatanshugi in 3 KAzoKU MoNDAi TO KAZOKUHO 247, Sakaishoten (1958);
Rokuya & Hatsuyo, A New Case on So-Called 'A Claim for Divorce from the Guilty Spouse, 40
KATEi SAIBAN GEPpo (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan (1988)); Shimazu and Nakagawa,
Shinzuku Sozoku, 96, Nihon Hiyoron Sha (1981); Uchiyama, Rikon Seikyu Kikyaku in 3 KAZOKUHO
TAmE 194, Yuhikaku (1959); Uramoto, Legal Theory on the Principle of Breakdown in Divorce and
the Protection of Spouse, 32 KuMAMOTO L REV. 119-21; Wagazuma, Shinzokuho, 176, Yuhikaku
(1968); Wagazuma and Tateishi, Shinzokuho Sozokuho, 150, Nihon Hiyoronsha (1961); Yonekura,
Sekyokuteki Hatanshugi de nazeikenainoka in No. 893 JuRisT 38 Yuhikaku; Yoshida, Konin-Haran
no Genin no Nintei nitsuite in 2 Gendai Kazokuho Taikei, 207 Yuhikaku, (1980).

